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Soviet Prisoners in the Afghan Conflict
In May 1982, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) took a bold step toward improving the law governing civil
war by concluding an agreement on the detention of prisoners of war
in the Afghan conflict.1 This agreement was necessary because there
is little existing law covering civil war. In international wars, the full
Geneva Conventions apply. z In riots and lesser domestic strife,
human rights law applies.' But civil wars fall in neither category, and
for political and practical reasons, states have been unable thus far to
develop an adequate legal regime to cover them.4 Prior to 1982, as a
partial response to this gap in international law, the ICRC simply
developed ad hoc agreements to facilitate prisoner exchanges during
various civil wars.5
1. The ICRC has not published the text of this agreement; its existence is confirmed by
various press reports. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 26, 1983, § 1, at 13, col. 1; Christian Sci.
Monitor, Dec. 28, 1982, at 5, col. 1; two letters to the author from Mr. Mark Ita, legal advisor
to operational activities of the ICRC, Dec. 28, 1983 and Mar. 20, 1984 [hereinafter cited as Ita,
letter Dec. 28, 1983 and Ita, letter Mar. 20, 1984].
2. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 [hereinafter cited as Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363; Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
Mr. Ita confirms in his Mar. 20, 1984 letter that the full Geneva Conventions do not apply
to the Afghan conflict. Ita, letter Mar. 20, 1984, supra note 1.
3. Meron, On the Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and the
Need for a New Instrument, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 589, 603-04 (1983).
4. For discussions of the application of law to civil war, see generally J.E. BOND, THE
RULES OF RIOT (1974); Farer, Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflicts: Toward a Definition
of 'InternationalArmed Conflict', 71 COLUM. L. REV. 37 (1971); Draper, The Implementation
and Enforcement of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of the Two Additional Protocols of
1978, in 164 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (1979); Schindler, The Different Types ofArmed Conflicts
According to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, in 163 RECUEIL DES COURS 117 (1979).
5. See, e.g., a description of activities in the Namibian conflict in INTERNATIONAL COM-
MITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, ANNUAL REPORT, at 11-16 (1982).
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Under the 1982 agreement, however, the ICRC finally went be-
yond a simple ad hoe exchange. Instead, it negotiated the release of
Soviet prisoners from Afghan rebels for internment in Switzerland.6
The agreement is a creative innovation: it has kept men alive who
might otherwise have been killed,7 and it may point the way to a solu-
tion to one legal problem of civil war. On the other hand, only nine of
200-300 prisoners held by the rebels have been helped under the
agreement.8 Moreover, four or five of the nine have asked to remain
in Switzerland rather than be repatriated to the Soviet Union, thus
raising the difficult question of whether the prisoners may be forcibly
repatriated under the terms of the agreement. 9
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CIVIL WAR
The civil war in Afghanistan, a brutal conflict in which both
sides have been accused of atrocities, is a prime example of how and
why international law has failed to restrain the conduct of parties in
internal war.10 The Soviets and the rebels alike have killed their pris-
oners rather than hold them to the end of the fighting. Though it
seems that the growing body of human rights law would prohibit
most of this conduct, it is very unlikely that these or other states
would ever invoke such law. Human rights law is largely unenforced
in the best of times, and states have the legal right to derogate from
their human rights obligations during a national emergency, such as
a civil war. 12
Nor does the law applicable to international war apply during
civil war. When the Hague and Geneva Conventions were negotiated,
the ICRC proposed that they cover civil war, 3 but the suggestion was
soundly rejected by states out of concern for state sovereignty. 14 Even
6. Ita, letter Dec. 28, 1983, supra note 1.
7. This benefit of the agreement was cited to the author by Dmitry P. Titov, Second
Secretary of the Permanent Mission of the USSR to the United Nations on Feb. 10, 1984; it is
the only information the author could obtain from the Soviet Union with regard to the
agreement.
8. Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 28, 1982, at 5, col. 1.
9. Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1983, at 31, col. 4.
10. Time, Jan. 9, 1984, at 37; Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 28, 1982, at 5, col. 1; Chris-
tian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 1, 1983, at 6, col. 1.
11. Meron, supra note 3, at 600-02.
12. Professor Meron is urging that a new convention be written to extend human rights
protection to emergency situations. Others have made similar suggestions. Id.; see also Recent
Developments, Geneva Convention Signatories Clarify Applicability of Laws of War to Internal
Armed Conflict, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 941, 949 (1978).
13. Baxter, lus in Bello, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 518, 519
(J.N. Moore ed. 1974).
14. Id. In civil war, the incumbent government may be losing control over all or part of
the state. The government does not want to admit this because to do so enhances the stature of
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if the ICRC had persuaded states to extend international law to civil
war it is not clear that such a change would do any good. Modern
civil wars, like the Afghan conflict, often involve guerilla warfare.
Guerillas rarely are in a position to implement the 550 articles of the
Geneva Conventions. Since guerillas are frequently on the move and
often have little food or water to spare, prisoners can be a burden and
are often executed. This has certainly been true of the Afghan
conflict. 15
The ICRC, however, did not fail completely at Geneva. Four
articles out of the 550 do apply to civil war. All four conventions
have an identical article, sometimes called the "mini-convention" or
"common article three."' 6 This common article, which will be re-
ferred to as Article Three, protects persons who take no active part in
the hostilities, and was developed as a compromise between states that
wanted some humanitarian law to cover armed conflict and states that
did not want to enhance the status of rebels by developing a full con-
vention to cover civil war. Article Three was kept short and simple to
satisfy the anti-convention states, 17 and by now probably has entered
the body of customary law along with the rest of the Geneva Conven-
tions so that all states are bound by its terms.18 Practically speaking,
however, this has meant very little. Not a single state has ever ac-
knowledged explicitly that it considers itself bound by Article Three
while engaged in a civil war.' 9 Moreover, because Article Three is so
the insurgents, allowing them to persuade foreign countries and the indigenous population that
eventually they will triumph and should be supported. By extending international law to civil
war, governments would appear to be giving rebels the status of states, the very thing the
government is fighting the war to avoid. Farer, supra note 4, at 66-67.
15. Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 28, 1982, at 5, col. 1.
16. The article in common states that:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character...
(I) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and
in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples ....
17. For sources on the history of Article Three, see supra note 4.
18. Schindler, supra note 4, at 151.
19. Kilgore, Geneva Convention Signatories Clarify Applicability of Laws of War to Inter-
nal Armed Conflict, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 941, 949 (1978).
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simple, it offers very little guidance to states on how to implement it
during a civil war.20 Article Three certainly does not answer the
question of how guerillas should detain prisoners and consequently
has had no impact on the Afghan conflict by its own force.
To solve some of Article Three's deficiencies, two additional pro-
tocols were adopted in 1977.21 Protocol I declares that wars of libera-
tion are international, not civil wars. Therefore, most of the
international law of war applies to wars of liberation.22 Protocol II
has extended a number of protections to victims of civil war, espe-
cially civilians. For example, it forbids "starvation of civilians as a
method of combat," requires that "detained persons may send and
receive mail" and prohibits "acts of hostility against historic monu-
ments."'23 Certain criteria must be met, however, before Protocol II
applies. Article One requires that the dissident's armed forces must
be organized, must have a commander, and must exercise control
over enough territory "to enable them to carry out sustained and con-
certed military operations and to implement this protocol. ' 24 These
criteria have had the result of excluding most civil wars from the
scope of Protocol II. Indeed, even if the Soviet Union and Afghani-
stan were parties to the Protocol, it would not apply to the Afghan
conflict. The rebels do control a significant amount of territory,25 but
they do not meet any of the other requirements.26 So the very limited
body of law on civil war, namely common Article Three and Protocol
II of the Geneva Conventions, has no significant impact on the prob-
lem of prisoners in the Afghan conflict.
II. THE 1982 AGREEMENT
The agreement negotiated by the ICRC overcomes some of the
obstacles preventing a full-fledged legal regime on civil war. First,
regarding the sovereignty problem,27 the ICRC is exceedingly discreet
about the existence of the agreement. The text is unpublished,28 thus
20. J. BOND, supra note 4, at 4-6, criticizing the simplicity of Article Three; Draper,
supra note 4, at 26-27.
21. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 16 I.L.M. 1442
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Protocol II].
22. Protocol I, art. 1(4).
23. Protocol II, arts. 5, 14 & 16.
24. Id., art. 1(1).
25. Time, supra note 10, at 37.
26. Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 1, 1983, at 6, col. I.
27. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
28. According to Mark Ita:
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avoiding the impression that the Soviets are awarding the Afghan
rebels international status by concluding a treaty with them. In fact,
the agreement may not be a treaty at all-it may be a non-binding
agreement, the sort of instrument made famous by the Helsinki Ac-
cords.2 9 It is impossible to say what sort of agreement it is, or indeed,
even who the parties are, since the ICRC has said almost nothing on
either point. They have said only that it "is the result of negotiations
conducted with all the parties involved and above all is based on the
free will of the persons to whom the ICRC is giving assistance. '30
Second, the agreement solves the problem of the guerillas' inabil-
ity to provide for large numbers of prisoners. The Geneva Conven-
tions have several articles that probably inspired the ICRC to devise
the arrangement for Afghanistan.3' In particular, Articles 12 and 110
of the Geneva Prisoners Convention allow transfer of prisoners of war
to neutral countries under certain circumstances. 32 In the 1982 agree-
ment, Afghan rebels agreed to turn over to the ICRC Soviet prisoners
in their custody. The Swiss government in turn agreed to detain these
prisoners on behalf of the ICRC, which does not have the facilities to
hold the prisoners itself. The Soviet Union will pay for the cost of
internment, which is a departure from the Geneva Conventions; nor-
mally under Article 15 the detaining power pays all costs. 33 In ex-
change for allowing Swiss detention, the Kabul authorities agreed to
allow the ICRC to inspect prisons in Kabul where rebels are being
held in order to certify that conditions and treatment are humane.34
The agreement may also contemplate an eventual exchange of prison-
ers, but no exchange so far has taken place.35
Any Soviet soldier in the hands of the rebels will be interviewed
by the ICRC and asked if he wants to go to Switzerland for two years
or until the end of hostilities, whichever is sooner. Prisoners may
have as many confidential interviews as they wish.36 It must be a sol-
[I]t is the established policy of the ICRC not to disclose public documents of
such a kind where the confidence and trust of the parties in the ICRC and the inter-
ests of the victims are involved. This policy of discretion enables the ICRC to gain
the trust and confidence of all kinds of authorities and movements and thereby to
fulfill its multiple tasks of bringing assistance and protection to the victims of armed
conflicts throughout the world.
Ita, letter Dec. 28, 1983, supra note 1.
29. For a discussion of nonbinding agreements, see Schachter, The Twilight Existence of
Nonbinding Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296-304 (1977).
30. Ita, letter Dec. 28, 1983, supra note 1.
31. Ita, letter Mar. 20, 1984, supra note 1.
32. Geneva Convention III, supra note 2, arts. 12 & 110.
33. Id. at art. 15.
34. Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 1, 1983, at 6, col. 1.
35. Id.
36. Ita, letter Dec. 28, 1983, supra note 1.
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dier's own decision to go because "it is a fundamental principle of the
ICRC never to act against the free will of the victims. ' 37 Each pris-
oner must consent in writing to his transfer to Switzerland.38
III. PROBLEMS UNDER THE AGREEMENT
Since May 1982, when negotiations were concluded, only nine
prisoners have gone to Switzerland.39 One prisoner escaped in July
1983 to the Federal Republic of Germany where he is seeking asy-
lum.4' The Swiss government holds the remaining prisoners in a
"special camp" designed for Swiss citizens who commit minor infrac-
tions while on their annual three week military training.4 Conditions
appear to be excellent. The prisoners have regular mail and access to
the media.42 They have outings and opportunities to earn money.
Their only visitors, however, are officials of the ICRC and Soviet au-
thorities who may visit once every two months.43
Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and
the International Commission of Justice have been denied visits to the
camp.44 These groups have become increasingly concerned about the
prisoners, not because of prison conditions, but rather because of the
issue of repatriation.45 A spokeswoman for Freedom House has sug-
gested that the lives of the prisoners may be endangered by sending
them back to the Soviet Union.46
The Soviet Union has asked for a pledge from the ICRC that it
will in fact repatriate the prisoners.47 The Soviets have a good legal
argument that the soldiers in fact should be repatriated since the men
agreed in writing to the arrangement, which includes repatriation at
the end of two years. Moreover, the Soviet Union believes that inter-
national law requires forcible repatriation of prisoners of war. At the
Geneva negotiating sessions, the Soviets pointed out that Article 118
of the prisoners convention requires forcible repatriation.48
37. Id.
38. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1983, § 1, at 13, col. 1.
39. Ita, letter Dec. 28, 1983, supra note 1.
40. Id.
41. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1983, § 1, at 13, col. 1.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 1, 1983, at 6, col. 4.
45. Id.
46. Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 1983, at 32, col. 4; see also Wall St. J., Nov. 9,1983, at 31, col. 4.
47. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1983, § 1, at 13, col. 1.
48. The article states that "[p]risoners of war shall be released and repatriated without
delay after the cessation of active hostilities." Geneva Convention III, supra note 2. The
Soviet Union argued for this interpretation again during the Korean prisoner repatriation con-
troversy. See also Gutteridge, The Repatriation of Prisoners, 22 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 207-16
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The ICRC has made it clear that it rejects the Soviet Union's
legal arguments and will not repatriate the prisoners against their
wishes.49 It says that its position is based, among other things, on
"prevailing legal opinion regarding the problem of repatriation and
the interpretation of Article 118 of the Third Geneva Convention."5
It must be noted, however, that the ICRC has only said that it will
not forcibly repatriate the prisoners. It says that at the end of intern-
ment any prisoner not wishing to return to the Soviet Union will
come under Swiss jurisdiction; it will be for the Swiss government "to
proceed in accordance with. . . legislation in force."51 In May 1984,
two prisoners did return to the Soviet Union from Switzerland. It is
assumed that they wished to return.
The Swiss have not yet said what they would do if a prisoner did
not wish to return. They have been faced, however, with such a deci-
sion before. After World War II, approximately 9,000 Soviet soldiers
who had escaped from German prisoner-of-war camps were in Swit-
zerland. The Swiss government sent them back to the Soviet Union
where Stalin had them exiled to Siberia. 2 In light of this incident and
of contemporary human rights principles, the soldiers should be
granted asylum after their release from detention. There is, however,
another important consideration. Granting asylum to Soviet prison-
ers would displease the Soviet Union, and thus would jeopardize the
ICRC agreement and the lives of the prisoners held by the rebels in
Afghanistan. This is the cost of allowing a few men to remain in
Switzerland.
The ultimate fate of the prisoners is yet to be decided. This un-
certainty may be why so few prisoners have agreed to go to Switzer-
land.5 3 (After negotiations were completed, it was thought that
hundreds would go within a few months.) Further, the rebels have
stopped allowing the soldiers to be transferred to the ICRC and have
charged that the Soviets have failed to fulfill their end of the
bargain. 4
In August 1982, the ICRC was allowed to inspect prisons in
Kabul. It interviewed 338 prisoners-as many as 60 without any
other witnesses-at Pul-i-charki, Kabul's most infamous prison. The
(1953) for an account of the Korean controversy. The Soviets believe that prisoners of war are
in no position to make a truly independent decision and should therefore be repatriated auto-
matically. Id.
49. Ita, letter Mar. 20, 1984, supra note 1.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1983, § 1, at 13, col. 1.
53. Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 28, 1982, at 5, col. 1.
54. Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 1, 1983, at 6, col. 1.
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ICRC also visited "dozens" of other prisons, but after two months
they were ordered to leave. Reports suggest that the Soviets were un-
happy that so few prisoners had been transferred to Switzerland-by
then only five or six had gone-and, presumably, this unhappiness
triggered the expulsion.5 On the other hand, the rebels may have
sent only five or six to begin with because they were waiting to see a
demonstration of Soviet good faith on the prison-inspection issue. At
any event, ICRC officials say they are still working to gain entry to
the prisons5 6 and that neither party has revoked the agreement
7
though no action has been taken pursuant to it for more than two
years.
IV. CONCLUSION
In practice, the ICRC agreement has proven anything but a
glowing success. In fact, it seems to have all but broken down: a
mere nine out of hundreds of prisoners have been transferred to Swit-
zerland. Furthermore, the ICRC managed to spend only two months
in Afghanistan touring prisons. From a legal standpoint, however,
this agreement is a hopeful development. The approach taken in the
agreement suggests new possibilities for enhancing the international
law governing internal war. Moreover, it highlights a very basic ques-
tion for lawyers working in this area: should efforts be directed to-
ward developing ad hoc arrangements for particular conflicts? Or
should the Afghan agreement be used as a foundation for a new, gen-
eral convention on civil war? Jurists tend to think that war is no time
to negotiate a treaty and that it is better to have them in place at the
outset of hostilities. Yet ad hoc agreements may be the only type of
agreement feasible in politically-charged civil wars. No matter which
direction is taken, one feature of the Afghan agreement should defi-
nitely be preserved: the ICRC should continue its efforts to establish
arrangements with those guerilla movements who feel that they can
afford only to execute their prisoners.
Mary Ellen O'Connell*
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Ita, letter Mar. 20, 1984, supra note 1.
* LL.B, Cambridge, 1982; J.D. Candidate, Columbia, 1985.
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